

THUCYDIDES AND THE TEACHING OF STRATEGY

A Review Essay by

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN

The Landmark Thucydides:
A Comprehensive Guide to the
Peloponnesian War

Edited by Robert B. Strassler

New York: The Free Press, 1996.

711 pp. \$45.00

[ISBN 0-684-82815-4]

Few senior government officials leave lasting legacies. Admiral Stansfield Turner, who was Jimmy Carter's director of central intelligence, is a notable exception. But he left his imprint not so much on CIA as on the Naval War College where some still speak of the "Turner revolution." Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then chief of naval operations, sent Turner to Newport to reform the curriculum in the wake of the Vietnam War. Among the lessons of that unfortunate conflict was the need to fight smarter, and Zumwalt wanted Newport to help the Navy reach this objective.

Although the syllabus that Turner introduced at the Naval War College has been continually refined and modified by many distinguished faculty members over the years, his essential creation and contribution endures. In some ways, a memoir of his experience as the president of the Naval War College would make even more fascinating reading than his published reflections on his years at Langley, since he achieved at Newport what few have managed to accomplish in an otherwise rigid bureaucracy: he refashioned an entrenched institution. The story would make an ideal case study for the Kennedy School of Government and the plethora of institutions that have sprung up to teach newly independent states of the former Warsaw Pact how to reform their bureaucracies.

At the heart of the Turner revolution lay rigor, structure, and vision. Like Gaul, the Naval War College curriculum is divided into three parts. Senior officers

and civilians from DOD and other agencies of government are exposed to national security decisionmaking, policy and strategy, and military operations. Turner enormously increased the academic requirements. The 15-week phase devoted to the study of policy and strategy, for example, still inflicts reading loads in excess of six hundred pages per week, and students must write multiple essays that are graded.

Upon crossing the threshold of the Strategy Department, every student receives a copy of *The Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides, a work of intellectually brilliant unfamiliarity. Reactions to this bizarre beginning are varied. Most students are initially bemused, some amused. A Marine colonel related to his classmates and the faculty that he had found the long-lost brother of Thucydides, "Thucydiddoodah." An Air Force officer concluded an essay by observing that the Athenians might have changed the course of the Western world had they managed to get one F-16. A young infantryman, after informing a professor that his presentation on Thucydides was the best lecture that he had ever heard on any subject, then added with a Cheshire cat grin, "Unfortunately, it didn't teach me squat about how to take that hill." In the "Gaeties," an end-of-term event when students roast the college and their favorite (or least favorite) faculty members, one naval officer did a strikingly faithful imitation of Robin Williams in *Good Morning, Vietnam*. In a mock sports report during his routine he announced that, while there had been no action in the Delian League, "in the Peloponnesian League, Argos defeated Tegea, 7-4; Sparta downed Mantinea, 14-9." There was even a period when students were seen wearing tee-shirts emblazoned with "Cleon Lives."

More to the point, when students finally got the chance to give their ultimate verdicts on the quality of the curriculum, only a few suggested that this ancient case study be replaced with one more modern or "relevant." In part, this was because students who had come home from Vietnam and endured searing rejection felt an affinity with the frustrated blame culture that Thucydides had vividly depicted. Athens had struggled with a crisis of values during an unexpectedly protracted war which, for all its great power as a city-state, it could not successfully conclude. Moreover, the students also yielded to the modernity of Thucydides' brilliant analyses. Events that Herodotus, his predecessor in Greek

history, might have explained with references to the will of the gods, local legend, and rumor, or to the overweening ambition of certain powerful leaders, Thucydides treated in terms indistinguishable from those of the best modern historians.

This constancy in intellectual method derives from an experiment with reason. The finest Greek thinkers came to believe, for complex reasons, that under the apparent chaos of daily life lay a natural order; that this order conformed to immutable principles; and that human beings could understand these principles by observation and contemplation. Whereas the Presocratic philosophers (such as Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes) first applied these assumptions to phenomena in the physical world, the Sophists used them in reflecting on the human condition, and we encounter them above all in Thucydides' great historical work, *The Peloponnesian War*.

Thucydides claims he is writing "a possession for all time," in that later ages would be able to learn from it because of the constancy of human nature as well as the broad consistency of social and political behavior that constancy yields. That is his reason for studying history. As he says later with regard to the revolution at Corcyra,

The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular cases.

Accordingly, in the speeches of the Athenian Pericles and the Spartan King Archidamus as their two coalitions contemplate making war against each other, we discover as good an example of net assessment as is found anywhere. We read a startlingly insightful exploration by Thucydides contrasting the need to maintain a reputation for decency, on the one hand, with the requirement in war to instill fear of unrelenting vindictiveness, on the other, as Cleon and Diodotus argue over the fate of the faithless Mytilenians. Then again, it is hard to contemplate a more straightforward, graphic description of *realpolitik* in Western literature than the Melian dialogue. Moreover, events leading to the battle between the Athenian and Sicilian fleets in Syracuse's harbor become in the hands of Thucydides a dramatic and poignant illustration of how clear strategic decision-making can founder on the shoals of operational incompetence. Thucydides

Alvin H. Bernstein taught Greek and Roman history at Cornell University and served as chairman of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College.

WHY TRAINING COUNTS

A Book Review by

WILLIAMSON MURRAY

Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning

by Eugenia C. Kiesling

Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996.

260 pp. \$35.00

[ISBN 0-7006-0764-1]

The fall of France in 1940, so sudden and catastrophic, so terrible in terms of its consequences, has attracted a host of historians to mull the wreckage and pontificate on its causes. For some the defeat was the result of a perennial French penchant for quarrelling among themselves. For others it arose from the insidious poisoning of national will by the left or right, depending on one's ideological stripe. And not surprisingly various commentators, from the great French historian Marc Block in *Strange Defeat* to the present, have argued that the French army was itself largely responsible.

More recently, some academic historians have argued rather bizarrely that the French army was *not* responsible for defeat, but rather it was external factors such as the nation's strategic situation, Britain's refusal to prepare effective land forces, political ineptitude, et al. Thus Maurice Gamelin, that extraordinarily intellectual general, did about as well as could be expected, given the conditions. This is nonsense. In the late 1980s a U.S. Army officer, Robert Doughty, completed a brilliant study entitled *The Seeds of Disaster, The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939*, on the formation of French doctrine in the interwar period. But Doughty ended his account in 1939 and only treated the 1940 campaign by implication. Nevertheless, the message was clear: for various reasons—some owing to happenstance, others to a lack of vision or incompetence—the French army developed doctrine that was almost wholly out of touch with the battlefield of 1940. Doughty demonstrated that the army was thus *the* major factor in the defeat of France that year.

Williamson Murray holds the Major General Matthew C. Horner chair of military history at the Marine Corps University.

In 1990 Doughty published *The Breaking Point, Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* which moved beyond the doctrinal framework of his earlier work to examine the breakthrough by XIX Panzer Corps along the Meuse in great detail. Its major contribution was the equal weight it gave to both forces; thus the catastrophe around Sedan and the heights behind the river became clear not just for what the Germans did but for what the French didn't—or did wrong. However, for all of Doughty's insight, in the end his book was only about one segment of the battlefield and thus represented only one piece of the puzzle.

The value of the book reviewed here is that it expands on Doughty's thesis in an important way. One might conclude from reading *Seeds of Disaster* and *The Breaking Point* that the French defeat was largely the result of doctrinal imbecility (although the argument is far more sophisticated than that). *Arming Against Hitler* by Eugenia Kiesling—who like Robert Doughty teaches history at West Point—addresses French doctrine and strategy in a broader framework than her colleague. But equally important, its look at training regular and reserve forces indicates that this was an army that hardly trained at all. Nearly every exercise was a carefully scripted display that looked good but did not extend troops or staffs. As the book sums up this sorry record:

The point is not that the French soldiers ought to have been better trained but that a close look at the circumstances in which the training took place reveals a "tyranny of the mundane"—the sheer organizational and physical impediments to doing what the army acknowledged it had to do.

Training during the "phony war" showed no serious improvement, a crucial factor in the eventual defeat because the enemy *did* train its reservists under the ruthless regime of the regular army.

There is an important lesson here. Had the French trained more effectively, then even with flawed doctrine the results along the Meuse on May 13, 1940 might well have been very different. And we know how close it was for the Germans—"almost a miracle" in Guderian's words. But the French did not train long and hard beforehand and thus wasted most of the "phony war." The results were catastrophic for themselves and almost for the West as well. We should not forget the lesson of this book: that hard, relentless training truly counts. And those who ignore it *will* pay an awful price. *Arming Against Hitler* thus is a splendid contribution to recognizing this simple, basic truth. **JFQ**

THE EVERYMAN'S JOINT LIBRARY

A Review Essay by

WILLIAM G. WELCH

Critiquing joint doctrine is like reviewing the Bible. You quickly discover that people have strong and divergent ideas on the subject. But we need to take stock of joint publications as a literary event as well as a doctrinal watershed. It is the manifestation of a process that could go on forever and the time is right for an azimuth and bearing check.

A lot of blood, sweat, and tears has gone into creating joint doctrine in the recent past. One milestone was the completion of capstone and keystone pubs and revamping their style and format. These volumes were issued in what is known as the Joint Doctrine Professional Library Desk Set packaged in a handy banker's box. The style is attractive, easy to read, and has great illustrations. This is a far cry from older eight-by-eleven pubs. The box contains a video and CD-ROM—both impressive products—which take full advantage of technology. The volumes have been published as part of an extensive campaign to promote joint doctrine that includes everything from coasters to wall calendars. An initial distribution of 5,000 desk sets was made in mid-1995 to general and flag officers, students at senior PME colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College, members of Congress, and principals in the services, unified commands, and Joint Staff. (While the distribution of these boxed sets was limited, all titles in this collection can be found on line at the Joint Doctrine Web Site [<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>]). The set includes Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, keystone pubs (2-0, 3-0, 4-0, 5-0, and 6-0, but not Joint Pub 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel and Administrative Support to Joint Operations*, which awaits approval to this day), a primer with summaries of all pubs, a compendium of titles both in print and under development, and Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Together these volumes provide an opportunity for a balanced review of the current scope and depth of joint doctrine.

LTC William G. Welch, USA (Ret.), served as Army representative to the special planning group for air operations ("the black hole") during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Joint Doctrine Professional Library Desk Set

Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 25, 1995. 88 pp.

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*
Washington: Government
Printing Office, January 10, 1995.
64 pp. \$3.25 (\$4.06 foreign)
[GPO Stock Number 008-020-01358-7]

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
February 24, 1995. 91 pp.

Joint Pub 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel and Administrative Support to Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
forthcoming.

Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 5, 1995. 124 pp.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
February 1, 1995. 156 pp.

Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
January 27, 1995. 78 pp.

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
April 13, 1995. 98 pp.

Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C⁴) Systems Support to Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 30, 1995. 82 pp.

Joint Pub 1-01.1, *Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
April 25, 1995. 64 pp.

Joint Doctrine Professional Library CD-ROM
Joint Electronic Library,
vol. 3, no. 1 (May 1995).

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States and Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*
VHS Video, 17 minutes.

The first hurdle in what will be a long haul was negotiated with completion of the keystone pubs. Now we have the makings of a joint doctrine system and are defining a common language. The level of detail is appropriate at this point in the process, about which more will be said later.

These pubs are impressive in quality and style. The format is user friendly. The CD-ROM technology offers excellent learning opportunities. Its compact size and ability to portray pictures and video in book form is a great innovation. The availability of modems and capacity of CDs, coupled with Internet, will continue to make doctrine more accessible.

The Pubs

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, reads like a stream of consciousness narrative (the Chairman's), and more than likely it is. Overall, the concept of jointness needs to be more clearly defined and explained. Appendix

A of Joint Pub 1-01.1 would be much better placed here in Joint Pub 1 than in the compendium. A good discussion of what jointness is and how the joint doctrine system works, this title would nevertheless benefit from a definition of the principles of war as applied to jointness. Discussing them in relation to warfare in the late 1990s would provide a transition from old service-oriented doctrine to the new jointness. Moreover, readability and flow need to be improved. The pub should be pegged on a slightly higher level considering that most of its intended readers hold master's degrees. Finally, examples should be more relevant to the subject matter and today's forces.

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action of the Armed Forces*, should be required reading for all flag and general officers as well as members of the Joint Staff and unified and component commands. It is an excellent primer on how the system works

including roles, missions, and functions. Public law does make the treatment of some responsibilities a difficult read, but that is probably inevitable when attempting to avoid misinterpretation.

Joint Pub 1-01.1, *Compendium of Joint Publications*, is an absolutely essential resource volume, but its format may not be right. Given the constantly changing body of joint publications, this material is an ideal candidate for electronic media and on-line updates. It is well suited to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) or Internet. Appendix A, "Warfighting American Style," would be better placed in Joint Pub 1. It is one of the most helpful descriptions of jointness and the doctrine process available. Finally, the selected quotes should match the chapter topics.

Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*, is by far the best of the capstone/keystone pubs. Its format, level of detail, and content should be the model for other joint publications. While some intelligence types say it is not what they want, nonspecialists find it a great explanation of how the system works on the joint level. Appendix B contains an excellent example of an intelligence estimate format. The only detractors are some busy graphics and charts, which is true of all these volumes (they look like some new version of Corel Draw after a large dose of steroids).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is the first keystone volume. Although it took a lot of compromises and some persuasion by the Chairman to get it out of the tank, it got the joint doctrine process off the ground. Unfortunately, it suffers from an unbalanced emphasis on land operations and neglects key aspects of maritime and air operations. Many quotations do not support the text and the illustrations need improvement. [See the author's review in *Common Perspective*, vol. 2, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 19-20.]

Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, is absolutely the weakest of the keystone pubs. It never gets beyond "feed the troops and pass the ammo." Joint logistics is far more complex than this sketchy treatment lets on. CINCs and JFCs seem to spend most of their time addressing it, but this pub does not offer much help. The broad brush approach proves the need for greater detail.

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, is excellent. It covers most of the bases in the joint planning system and how it is intended to work. The examples are confusing and do not

always seem to fit. Unfortunately the excessive use of bold typefaces and capitalization is distracting, and the layout leaves a lot of room for improvement. In addition, it would be a good volume in which to publish a couple of formats for a CINC or JFC campaign plan.


Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C⁴) Systems Support to Joint Operations*, provides a sound treatment of a complex subject although it may be somewhat technical for readers who only "let their fingers do the walking" on phone dials. However, this volume should be merged with the "C⁴ for the warrior" publication. Neither stands well alone, but together they explain the system adequately.

Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer is a collection of executive summaries of all volumes in the set and key doctrine publications. The summaries should be included either here or in each pub, but probably not in both. This volume is a good primer on the system for those who do not like details; but it must be updated as doctrine evolves. If reprinted it should be combined with Joint Pub 1-01.1. It is another serious candidate for electronic distribution.

What Needs to be Fixed

Now that we have joint doctrine, it must be unified. There is not much detail in these pubs. It took twenty years to get airbags in cars and it will probably take that long to get joint doctrine to the right place. Doctrine must put tools in the hands of JTF commanders and their staffs; yet these volumes are written on the executive summary level.

The graphics in joint publications need to be gotten under control. The emphasis must be on teaching, not smoke and mirrors. Some joint pubs have so



many layers of material, recycled briefing slides, and shades of purple that it requires a magnifying glass (with color filters) to focus on the page. Illustrations must be simple, presenting a few key concepts. Each quotation must substantively support the text and the sidebars must relate to the subject at hand rather than dish up historical tidbits seemingly apropos of nothing.

Most of the pubs cover the high end of their subjects and do not give JTF commanders and their staffs the level of detail required. There is a decided lack of operational tools for joint staffs. Staffs need standards—and devices to achieve them. We must develop tried joint concepts in order to form a coherent and truly joint team with a winning play book before the bullets start flying.

Joint doctrine differs from service doctrine. JFCs and CINCs are faced with

a full range of situations that runs from peaceful competition to all-out war. They need their own solutions and doctrine, not someone else's. World War II answers are no longer applicable. Frontal assaults are out. We live in a world where, as Clausewitz observed, war is "nothing but the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means." Joint doctrine is where the military meets the political. The "shoot 'em down, sort 'em out on the ground" approach will not suffice for CINCs or JFCs. They must combine the political, diplomatic, informational, and economic with the military to find a solution. The doctrine in keystone pubs only occasionally solves problems among the services and does little to resolve things that challenge joint commanders who need top down solutions that are designed for the problem at hand, not dross rising from the services. Old standards no longer apply and traditional compromises won't achieve victory. The next hurdle will probably be coping with too much doctrine as the pendulum swings in the other direction.

JFQ

Joint Doctrine on the World Wide Web

In an effort to enhance awareness of and increase access to joint doctrine, a World Wide Web site has been established at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>. For more information, contact the Joint Doctrine Division (J-7), Joint Staff, at (703) 614-6469 / DSN 224-6469.

JFQ



JFQ
welcomes your letters
and comments

Fax your correspondence to
(202) 685-4219/DSN 325-4219
or via e-mail to JFQ1@ndu.edu

Strategic Assessment 1997

Flashpoints and Force Structure

published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies,
National Defense University

300 pp., illustrated. \$27.00 (\$33.75 foreign)

[ISBN 1-57906-029-3]


This volume surveys the major powers, significant regional contingencies, troubled states, and transnational problems active on the world stage today. In addition to regional contingencies and military operations other than war, the United States will increasingly confront the rise of potential theater-peer competitors. Such threats will challenge the Armed Forces to address a broad set of tasks which include incorporating innovations in doctrine, organization, and technology that originate from the revolution in military affairs (RMA). *Strategic Assessment 1997* highlights the need to have the ability to overwhelmingly defeat a rogue regime in a major regional conflict while deterring and preparing to defeat a second such regime. And the Nation must provide a sufficient “on call” capability for peace operations.

Turning to force structure, *Strategic Assessment 1997* also presents three heuristic models likely to loom large in the next decade. A *recapitalization* force model emphasizes continuity of the existing force but with some overall reduction to fund a recapitalization of equipment as it becomes obsolete. An *accelerated RMA* force model quickly integrates system-of-systems technologies and radically changes force structure to take full advantage of new capabilities. Finally, a *full spectrum* force model responds most directly to the emerging strategic environment by retaining most of the current force while experimenting with RMA technologies and creating an “on call” capability to deal with operations other than war, requiring a higher budget than the other two forces.

To order, call the U.S. Government Printing Office at
(202) 512-1800, visit a GPO bookstore, or write to:

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

[Cite GPO stock number 008-020-01418-4]



For *Strategic Assessment*
and other INSS publications,
visit the
National Defense University
on the Internet at
<http://www.ndu.edu>

WHY TRAINING COUNTS

A Book Review by

WILLIAMSON MURRAY

Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning

by Eugenia C. Kiesling

Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1996.

260 pp. \$35.00

[ISBN 0-7006-0764-1]

The fall of France in 1940, so sudden and catastrophic, so terrible in terms of its consequences, has attracted a host of historians to mull the wreckage and pontificate on its causes. For some the defeat was the result of a perennial French penchant for quarrelling among themselves. For others it arose from the insidious poisoning of national will by the left or right, depending on one's ideological stripe. And not surprisingly various commentators, from the great French historian Marc Block in *Strange Defeat* to the present, have argued that the French army was itself largely responsible.

More recently, some academic historians have argued rather bizarrely that the French army was *not* responsible for defeat, but rather it was external factors such as the nation's strategic situation, Britain's refusal to prepare effective land forces, political ineptitude, et al. Thus Maurice Gamelin, that extraordinarily intellectual general, did about as well as could be expected, given the conditions. This is nonsense. In the late 1980s a U.S. Army officer, Robert Doughty, completed a brilliant study entitled *The Seeds of Disaster, The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939*, on the formation of French doctrine in the interwar period. But Doughty ended his account in 1939 and only treated the 1940 campaign by implication. Nevertheless, the message was clear: for various reasons—some owing to happenstance, others to a lack of vision or incompetence—the French army developed doctrine that was almost wholly out of touch with the battlefield of 1940. Doughty demonstrated that the army was thus *the* major factor in the defeat of France that year.

Williamson Murray holds the Major General Matthew C. Horner chair of military history at the Marine Corps University.

In 1990 Doughty published *The Breaking Point, Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* which moved beyond the doctrinal framework of his earlier work to examine the breakthrough by XIX Panzer Corps along the Meuse in great detail. Its major contribution was the equal weight it gave to both forces; thus the catastrophe around Sedan and the heights behind the river became clear not just for what the Germans did but for what the French didn't—or did wrong. However, for all of Doughty's insight, in the end his book was only about one segment of the battlefield and thus represented only one piece of the puzzle.

The value of the book reviewed here is that it expands on Doughty's thesis in an important way. One might conclude from reading *Seeds of Disaster* and *The Breaking Point* that the French defeat was largely the result of doctrinal imbecility (although the argument is far more sophisticated than that). *Arming Against Hitler* by Eugenia Kiesling—who like Robert Doughty teaches history at West Point—addresses French doctrine and strategy in a broader framework than her colleague. But equally important, its look at training regular and reserve forces indicates that this was an army that hardly trained at all. Nearly every exercise was a carefully scripted display that looked good but did not extend troops or staffs. As the book sums up this sorry record:

The point is not that the French soldiers ought to have been better trained but that a close look at the circumstances in which the training took place reveals a "tyranny of the mundane"—the sheer organizational and physical impediments to doing what the army acknowledged it had to do.

Training during the "phony war" showed no serious improvement, a crucial factor in the eventual defeat because the enemy *did* train its reservists under the ruthless regime of the regular army.

There is an important lesson here. Had the French trained more effectively, then even with flawed doctrine the results along the Meuse on May 13, 1940 might well have been very different. And we know how close it was for the Germans—"almost a miracle" in Guderian's words. But the French did not train long and hard beforehand and thus wasted most of the "phony war." The results were catastrophic for themselves and almost for the West as well. We should not forget the lesson of this book: that hard, relentless training truly counts. And those who ignore it *will* pay an awful price. *Arming Against Hitler* thus is a splendid contribution to recognizing this simple, basic truth. **JFQ**

THE EVERYMAN'S JOINT LIBRARY

A Review Essay by

WILLIAM G. WELCH

Critiquing joint doctrine is like reviewing the Bible. You quickly discover that people have strong and divergent ideas on the subject. But we need to take stock of joint publications as a literary event as well as a doctrinal watershed. It is the manifestation of a process that could go on forever and the time is right for an azimuth and bearing check.

A lot of blood, sweat, and tears has gone into creating joint doctrine in the recent past. One milestone was the completion of capstone and keystone pubs and revamping their style and format. These volumes were issued in what is known as the Joint Doctrine Professional Library Desk Set packaged in a handy banker's box. The style is attractive, easy to read, and has great illustrations. This is a far cry from older eight-by-eleven pubs. The box contains a video and CD-ROM—both impressive products—which take full advantage of technology. The volumes have been published as part of an extensive campaign to promote joint doctrine that includes everything from coasters to wall calendars. An initial distribution of 5,000 desk sets was made in mid-1995 to general and flag officers, students at senior PME colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College, members of Congress, and principals in the services, unified commands, and Joint Staff. (While the distribution of these boxed sets was limited, all titles in this collection can be found on line at the Joint Doctrine Web Site [<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>]). The set includes Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, keystone pubs (2-0, 3-0, 4-0, 5-0, and 6-0, but not Joint Pub 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel and Administrative Support to Joint Operations*, which awaits approval to this day), a primer with summaries of all pubs, a compendium of titles both in print and under development, and Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Together these volumes provide an opportunity for a balanced review of the current scope and depth of joint doctrine.

LTC William G. Welch, USA (Ret.), served as Army representative to the special planning group for air operations ("the black hole") during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Joint Doctrine Professional Library Desk Set

Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 25, 1995. 88 pp.

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*
Washington: Government
Printing Office, January 10, 1995.
64 pp. \$3.25 (\$4.06 foreign)
[GPO Stock Number 008-020-01358-7]

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
February 24, 1995. 91 pp.

Joint Pub 1-0, *Doctrine for Personnel and Administrative Support to Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
forthcoming.

Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 5, 1995. 124 pp.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
February 1, 1995. 156 pp.

Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
January 27, 1995. 78 pp.

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
April 13, 1995. 98 pp.

Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C⁴) Systems Support to Joint Operations*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
May 30, 1995. 82 pp.

Joint Pub 1-01.1, *Compendium of Joint Doctrine Publications*
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff,
April 25, 1995. 64 pp.

Joint Doctrine Professional Library CD-ROM
Joint Electronic Library,
vol. 3, no. 1 (May 1995).

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States and Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*
VHS Video, 17 minutes.

The first hurdle in what will be a long haul was negotiated with completion of the keystone pubs. Now we have the makings of a joint doctrine system and are defining a common language. The level of detail is appropriate at this point in the process, about which more will be said later.

These pubs are impressive in quality and style. The format is user friendly. The CD-ROM technology offers excellent learning opportunities. Its compact size and ability to portray pictures and video in book form is a great innovation. The availability of modems and capacity of CDs, coupled with Internet, will continue to make doctrine more accessible.

The Pubs

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, reads like a stream of consciousness narrative (the Chairman's), and more than likely it is. Overall, the concept of jointness needs to be more clearly defined and explained. Appendix

A of Joint Pub 1-01.1 would be much better placed here in Joint Pub 1 than in the compendium. A good discussion of what jointness is and how the joint doctrine system works, this title would nevertheless benefit from a definition of the principles of war as applied to jointness. Discussing them in relation to warfare in the late 1990s would provide a transition from old service-oriented doctrine to the new jointness. Moreover, readability and flow need to be improved. The pub should be pegged on a slightly higher level considering that most of its intended readers hold master's degrees. Finally, examples should be more relevant to the subject matter and today's forces.

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action of the Armed Forces*, should be required reading for all flag and general officers as well as members of the Joint Staff and unified and component commands. It is an excellent primer on how the system works

including roles, missions, and functions. Public law does make the treatment of some responsibilities a difficult read, but that is probably inevitable when attempting to avoid misinterpretation.

Joint Pub 1-01.1, *Compendium of Joint Publications*, is an absolutely essential resource volume, but its format may not be right. Given the constantly changing body of joint publications, this material is an ideal candidate for electronic media and on-line updates. It is well suited to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) or Internet. Appendix A, "Warfighting American Style," would be better placed in Joint Pub 1. It is one of the most helpful descriptions of jointness and the doctrine process available. Finally, the selected quotes should match the chapter topics.

Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*, is by far the best of the capstone/keystone pubs. Its format, level of detail, and content should be the model for other joint publications. While some intelligence types say it is not what they want, nonspecialists find it a great explanation of how the system works on the joint level. Appendix B contains an excellent example of an intelligence estimate format. The only detractors are some busy graphics and charts, which is true of all these volumes (they look like some new version of Corel Draw after a large dose of steroids).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is the first keystone volume. Although it took a lot of compromises and some persuasion by the Chairman to get it out of the tank, it got the joint doctrine process off the ground. Unfortunately, it suffers from an unbalanced emphasis on land operations and neglects key aspects of maritime and air operations. Many quotations do not support the text and the illustrations need improvement. [See the author's review in *Common Perspective*, vol. 2, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 19-20.]

Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, is absolutely the weakest of the keystone pubs. It never gets beyond "feed the troops and pass the ammo." Joint logistics is far more complex than this sketchy treatment lets on. CINCs and JFCs seem to spend most of their time addressing it, but this pub does not offer much help. The broad brush approach proves the need for greater detail.

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, is excellent. It covers most of the bases in the joint planning system and how it is intended to work. The examples are confusing and do not

always seem to fit. Unfortunately the excessive use of bold typefaces and capitalization is distracting, and the layout leaves a lot of room for improvement. In addition, it would be a good volume in which to publish a couple of formats for a CINC or JFC campaign plan.


Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C⁴) Systems Support to Joint Operations*, provides a sound treatment of a complex subject although it may be somewhat technical for readers who only "let their fingers do the walking" on phone dials. However, this volume should be merged with the "C⁴ for the warrior" publication. Neither stands well alone, but together they explain the system adequately.

Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer is a collection of executive summaries of all volumes in the set and key doctrine publications. The summaries should be included either here or in each pub, but probably not in both. This volume is a good primer on the system for those who do not like details; but it must be updated as doctrine evolves. If reprinted it should be combined with Joint Pub 1-01.1. It is another serious candidate for electronic distribution.

What Needs to be Fixed

Now that we have joint doctrine, it must be unified. There is not much detail in these pubs. It took twenty years to get airbags in cars and it will probably take that long to get joint doctrine to the right place. Doctrine must put tools in the hands of JTF commanders and their staffs; yet these volumes are written on the executive summary level.

The graphics in joint publications need to be gotten under control. The emphasis must be on teaching, not smoke and mirrors. Some joint pubs have so



many layers of material, recycled briefing slides, and shades of purple that it requires a magnifying glass (with color filters) to focus on the page. Illustrations must be simple, presenting a few key concepts. Each quotation must substantively support the text and the sidebars must relate to the subject at hand rather than dish up historical tidbits seemingly apropos of nothing.

Most of the pubs cover the high end of their subjects and do not give JTF commanders and their staffs the level of detail required. There is a decided lack of operational tools for joint staffs. Staffs need standards—and devices to achieve them. We must develop tried joint concepts in order to form a coherent and truly joint team with a winning play book before the bullets start flying.

Joint doctrine differs from service doctrine. JFCs and CINCs are faced with

a full range of situations that runs from peaceful competition to all-out war. They need their own solutions and doctrine, not someone else's. World War II answers are no longer applicable. Frontal assaults are out. We live in a world where, as Clausewitz observed, war is "nothing but the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means." Joint doctrine is where the military meets the political. The "shoot 'em down, sort 'em out on the ground" approach will not suffice for CINCs or JFCs. They must combine the political, diplomatic, informational, and economic with the military to find a solution. The doctrine in keystone pubs only occasionally solves problems among the services and does little to resolve things that challenge joint commanders who need top down solutions that are designed for the problem at hand, not dross rising from the services. Old standards no longer apply and traditional compromises won't achieve victory. The next hurdle will probably be coping with too much doctrine as the pendulum swings in the other direction.

JFQ

Joint Doctrine on the World Wide Web

In an effort to enhance awareness of and increase access to joint doctrine, a World Wide Web site has been established at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>. For more information, contact the Joint Doctrine Division (J-7), Joint Staff, at (703) 614-6469 / DSN 224-6469.

JFQ



JFQ
welcomes your letters
and comments

Fax your correspondence to
(202) 685-4219/DSN 325-4219
or via e-mail to JFQ1@ndu.edu